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Translations [2]

Of the Classification of things

Controverted Point: That things cannot be grouped together by means of abstract ideas.

Theravādin: But you do not also deny that any things may combine or be included with other things under a concept of totality or universality. Hence, how can you deny that they may be grouped together? The organs of sense and their objects are, you admit, computed under the material aggregate of a living individual. Pleasant, painful, or neutral feelings are computed under the aggregate of feeling. Percepts on occasion of sense and ideation come under the aggregate of perception. Volitions on occasion of sense and ideation come under the aggregate of conscious concomitants. Consciousness on occasion of sense and ideation comes under the aggregate of consciousness. Hence, by admitting these inclusions, you must admit that things may be grouped by an idea.

Rājagirika, Siddhatthika: Then you understand “things being grouped together by ideas” in the same way as two bullocks may be grouped together by a rope or a yoke, an alms-bowl may be held together by a suspender, a dog may be held in by a leash?

Theravādin: Yes; and hence it is not less right to say that some things may be grouped together by other things (ideas).

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