This sutta is something of a “middle length” version of the better-known Brahmajālasutta (DN 1). Both these texts emphasize the importance of understanding the views of others. This is important, because we live and communicate in a cultural context, and our views are shared with those of others. Some of the views defined here are still current today, while others have disappeared in history. But we can still learn from the Buddha’s method to learn how to approach different views today. | A Tibetan translation of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Pañcatraya Sūtra is discussed by Peter Skilling in Mahāsūtras II, pp. 469–511.

The first three are varieties of eternalism. | Aroga (“free of disease”) is explained by the commentary as “permanent” (nicca), drawing on the root sense of the word, “unbroken”. However, aroga is always used in the sense “free of disease, well, healthy” (eg. MN 97:2.4), and this applies to the Brahmanical tradition as well as the Buddhist. Chandogya Upaniṣad 7.26.2 says that one who sees (the self) does not see death, they have no disease or pain. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.12 similarly says that one who sees the self will not suffer in the wake of the body, which Śaṅkāra explains, “Struggling with desires for himself, for his son, for his wife, and so on, he is born and dies again and again, and is diseased when his body is diseased.”

“Extinguishment in the present life” sounds like the Buddhist view, but since it is collected here with wrong views, it refers to misapprehension of absorption as being Nibbāna (MN 102:24.1). This is similar to the five views of DN 1:3.19.1. DN 1 adds sensual pleasures as a kind of false Nibbāna; it also makes it explicit that it is the extinguishment of “an existing being”. | In both suttas “extinguishment in the present life” is included with the views about the future, for unclear reasons. Skilling notes, however, that in the Pañcatraya Sūtra, “extinguishment in the present life” constitutes a separate category.

That is, there are five total propositions, of which the first three are varieties of eternalism, which if treated as a group, gives three kinds of views.

The Buddha subdivides the first kind of eternalist according to the kind of self that is envisaged. | The “form” of the self may be either “coarse” form such as a human body, or “subtle form” like the heaven realms. | A formless self is associated with formless attainments. | “Having form and being formless” is not meant as a paradox. It could mean that the self evolves or transitions through different states, sometimes having form, sometimes not. Or it could refer to something like different layers of sheaths of the self, where everything is the self, but may be lesser attributes of self. | Unified perception results from jhāna, diverse perception from sense experience. | Limited perception is associated with sense consciousness or a limited attainment of absorption, while limitless perception is associated with a limitless absorption. This seems to refer to the first formless attainment. | “Universal consciousness” (viññāṇakasiṇa) is equivalent to the second formless attainment, which is mentioned by both the Pali commentary and the Pañcatraya Sūtra.

This is the third formless attainment. | The fourth formless attainment, “neither perception nor non-perception” is so subtle that it cannot be considered an attainment with perception.

This describes the development of insight based on deep absorption. Even the most refined states are still conditioned and therefore “coarse” compared to Nibbāna.

The suttas occasionally mention the “non-percipient beings” (DN 1:2.31.1). The commentaries explain this as a realm of pure form, where consciousness is suspended for a long time. This is tricky to interpret in line with the Buddhist classes of existence, since such a state could not be considered “formless”. A similar problem comes when the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception is considered to have form (MN 102:8.1). Such cases must refer to sectarian views that do not fit within the Buddhist system.

Also at SN 22.53:2.2, etc. | The process of rebirth is often described in terms of consciousness, as in dependent origination or, say, the “stream of consciousness” (DN 28:7.13). However, consciousness never exists by itself, but only in relation to the other aggregates. The case of the formless realm might seem an exception, yet even formless rebirth is dependent on form of the past, since the four “form” absorptions are the basis for the formless attainments. Thus while the formless realms can be described without reference to present form they cannot be described without reference to form at all.

This is the highest of the formless attainments. | “Stupor” is sammoha.

The commentary resolves the compound diṭṭhasutamutaviññātabba by applying the future passive participle viññātabba to the preceding items: diṭṭhaviññātabbamattena sutaviññātabbamattena mutaviññātabbamattena. However the same phrase occurs at SN 35.95:10.1 and AN 4.24:7.5, and in both cases the future passive sense is clearly meant to be distributed to each item. This grammatical form is characteristic of the epistemic tetrad from its origins (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.5, 4.5.6).

Cp. SN 14.11.

This “residue” is the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception itself.

For uddhaṁ saraṁ (“heading upstream”) in the sense “heading for rebirth in a higher realm”, compare uddhaṁsoto (“one who heads upstream”), a term for a non-returner.

This is a pointed criticism of those who approach spiritual life with a materialist mindset.

“Fear and disgust” is what in the second Noble Truth is called “craving for non-existence” (vibhavataṇhā). | “Substantial reality” (sakkāya) is the five aggregates that make up the three realms of existence, and which are grasped at as an “existing being” (sato sattassa).

Sā (Sanskrit śvan) is a short form for “dog” from the same root as soṇa and sunakha, all of which are distantly related to English “hound”. This simile is also at SN 22.99:2.1.

This statement seems misplaced here, as the introduction included “extinguishment in the present life” which has not yet been discussed. Probably it should occur further down, perhaps at MN 102:25.1.

“Theories of the past” are not mentioned in the introduction. In the Brahmajālasutta (DN 1), such theories are logically described before theories of the future. The theories of the past are similar to those of the Brahmajālasutta, but not identical, so they cannot have been simply copied over. These theories may have originally been mentioned in the introduction and listed at the start of the sutta, but displaced due to textual corruption. We have already seen in the preceding segment that corruption is likely at this point. Analayo discusses this issue in detail (Comparative Study, vol. ii, p. 597ff).

See the four kinds of eternalism at DN 1:1.30.1. | The phrase “self and cosmos” (attā ca loko ca) refers to the Upaniṣadic view, where the Self is ultimately a contingent aspect of the divinity that is the cosmos. That is why they occur together, as their nature and fate is inseparable. This is not true of other philosophies, as for example where a “soul” is created in a pre-existing universe, or when the universe is felt to be impermanent but the soul is eternal.

This implies that at some point in the past, the self and the world appeared, which the commentary equates with the two kinds of “origination by chance” of DN 1:2.30.1.

Compare the four kinds of “partial eternalism” (DN 1:2.1.1).

The commentary suggests that these are the “endless flip-floppers” of DN 1:2.23.1. That may be so, but they are characterized by the refusal to make a statement, whereas here we have a definite statement, even if the exact sense is unclear. As a rule, constructions of the “neither … nor” type point to a subtle state that does not fit a dualistic description. Perhaps it refers to a philosophy that words such as “eternal” are inadequate, because “eternal” means “live for an infinite time” whereas they believed in a destiny that transcends time.

These four views correspond to the same four “theories of the past” at DN 1:2.16.1. In addition, all the following items in this list are “theories of the future” at DN 1:2.38.7. Clearly it is possible to have similar views in relation to both the past and future. The classification of the finitude of the cosmos in relation to time seems puzzling, although in a relativistic universe time and distance are inextricably linked by the speed of light.

The phrase “pure and bright” (parisuddhe pariyodāte) normally describes the fourth absorption. The argument here may be parsed as follows. Even in the highest form of consciousness it is not possible to directly know such things as whether the cosmos is infinite. Any such doctrine, therefore, must be inferred from experience through the five forms of unreliable knowledge starting with faith. They are therefore confidently asserting things of which they have no direct knowledge. Because of this, even the portion of genuine knowledge and insight their meditation has brought them is corrupted by attachment. | Pariyodāta (“bright”) is glossed by the commentary as pabhassara (“radiant”). But “brighten” doesn’t quite work here for the verbal form pariyodapenti, so I use “illuminate”.

The following section illustrates how genuine experiences of deep meditation become misapprehended as “extinguishment in the present life”. It begins with a lengthy and unique description of the absorptions, before specifying how grasping intervenes. | The “rapture of seclusion” includes the first two absorptions, which are characterized by rapture (pīti).

Upon emerging from the bliss of absorption, the mind experiences anew all the flavors of life, including sadness. Typically a meditator is happy and refreshed for a long time after a deep meditation. Still, there can be a sense of loss of the blissful state, and a melancholy reflection that that too is impermanent.

The “pleasure not of the flesh” (nirāmisaṁ sukhaṁ) is the third absorption, characterized by the ending of rapture and the persistence of pleasure (sukha). At SN 36.31:5.1 it is described as all the jhānas leading up to the third. The same sense is also at AN 6.45:24.3.

This is the fourth absorption.

The repeated “I am” (ahamasmi) emphasizes the conceit that reinforces the sense of self.

The practice of absorption leads to Nibbāna, but if the state of absorption itself is misapprehended as being Nibbāna, the misapprehension is a form of attachment.

This contrasts with the earlier statement that they had let go of views of the past and future before entering absorption. Perhaps they had had temporarily let them go, only for them to re-arise later. Or perhaps there is an editorial issue.

The Brahmajālasutta also emphasizes how liberation from the “sixty-two” wrong views is achieved through insight into the “six fields of contact” (DN 13.71.12).