The narrative of this sutta is entertainingly chaotic, with characters appearing and disappearing at random, many of whom are unknown or little-known elsewhere. This is a lifelike impression of how hard it is to maintain a rational dialogue among the comings and goings. Historically it gives a brief but telling character portrait of Viḍūḍabha, the ill-starred prince of Kosala.

Ujuññā was a Kosalan town at which discussed asceticism with the naked ascetic Kassapa in DN 8. | “Deer parks” were nature reservations where the animals were safe from hunters.

These sisters were apparently both married to the King and, like his chief queen Mallikā, were devoted to the Buddha. Somā is perhaps the devout laywoman mentioned at AN 8.91–117:1.1, but is probably not the bhikkhunī of the same name mentioned at SN 5.2 and Thig 3.8. Sakulā likewise is probably not the same person as the bhikkhunī mentioned in Thig 5.7 and AN 1.242:1.1.

The Buddha was well aware of the fact that people did, in fact, make such claims, as he discussed them several times (eg. MN 76:21.1). He just thought the claims were wrong. One unique detail of the phrasing here is that it is in future tense (also used below at MN 90:8.5). The implication seems to be that not only is it the case that no-one currently makes such claims, but that no-one ever will in the future. | Compare with other statements on omniscience at MN 14:17.3 and MN 71:5.2.

The King’s son and heir, whose disastrous reign heralded the destruction of the Sakyans and the collapse of the Kosalan empire.

Ākāsa here is the Pali form of Sanskrit āgastya, the clan descending from the Vedic seer Agastya.

Consciousness is conditioned, so any instance of knowing depends on a particular stimulus. At MN 76:52.5 the Buddha discusses the related point of whether knowledge is continuous, illustrating it with a simile of an amputee.

The Buddha acknowledges the social distinctions between the classes.

Nimmathita refers to the process whereby a flame is produced by “churning” with a fire-drill. See Rig Veda 3.23.1a, 3.29.12a, 6.48.5, 8.48.6a, etc.

The sense of atthi devā (“do gods survive?”) is made clear by the following discussion. Compare atthi attā (“the self survives”) at SN 44.10:1.3 and MN 2:8.2 in the same sense. In such cases the verb atthi implies continued existence in a future life. We find a similar usage in Kaṭha Upaniṣad 1.20, where Naciketa wonders what happens to a man after he dies, as “some say he survives, while others say he does not survive” (astīty eke nāyam astīti caike).

Questions with atthi (“exists”, “survives”) about the self and rebirth are routinely met indirectly. Here the Buddha asks for clarification; at SN 44.10:1.3 he avoids answering; at MN 100:42.5 he answers in an oblique fashion. The reason for this seems to be that the verb atthi conveys the metaphysical implication of “eternal existence”. The king clarifies that he wants to know what happens when a god passes away, showing that he is asking about rebirth rather than eternal existence.

This builds on the discussion with Pasenadi in MN 88:10.6, where “hurtful” or “afflicted” (sabyābajjha) behavior leads to suffering, elsewhere described as rebirth in a “hurtful” realm (eg. MN 57:8.2).

In a few words we learn a lot about how Viḍūḍabha sees himself: he is an afflicted god.

Bho (“worthy”) is typically used by brahmins; he also uses it in reference to the king below.

Compare the discussion in the Jain Viyāhapaṇṇatti 6.9.144, where pure gods are beyond the scope of impure gods.

If Pasenadi does not know Ānanda, this must be a very early encounter, perhaps his first.

Not only does Viḍūḍabha exhibit poor leadership by blaming a subordinate, he is evidently lying about it.